APRIL 11, 2024, 10:00 AM

 By Geoff Ramsey, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and Caleb McCarry, the former Cuba transition coordinator under U.S. President George W. Bush. 

These days, political consensus in Washington is hard to come by. But there is a rare degree of alignment in both Democratic and Republican foreign-policy circles on the need for a more realist approach toward Venezuela—one that balances U.S. interests with the need for a democratic solution to Caracas’s political crisis

Like the United States, Venezuela also holds presidential elections later this year. Though the concurrent votes—and their varied potential outcomes—will have significant ramifications for U.S.-Venezuela relations, Washington’s policy toward Caracas is unlikely to change dramatically based on who wins the White House.

Those who have followed the recent ups and downs of U.S. Venezuela policy know this story: After a so-called “maximum pressure” campaign failed to topple Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the White House changed tactics, pivoting to support negotiations with Maduro’s government—and even sending officials to Caracas to engage in back-channel conversations to further U.S. interests.

 This shift is often described as taking place under U.S. President Joe Biden, who last year lifted some sanctions on Venezuela and its vast oil sector in exchange for concessions in long-running—yet often stalled—talks between Maduro and the opposition. Sanctions relief was meant to incentivize Maduro to ensure that Venezuela’s July 28 vote is more competitive than previous elections, and to facilitate the release of American prisoners held in the country. Biden officials have also worked with their Venezuelan counterparts to move these issues forward.